1¿ù 13ÀÏ ¿ù¿äÀÏ
¾ÆÀ̵ð
ºñ¹Ð¹øÈ£
¾ÆÀ̵ð ã±â
Ƽ¼ÅÃ÷ (¹ÝÆÈ)
Ƽ¼ÅÃ÷ (±äÆÈ)
Ä¿Ç÷è (ÇÒÀÎ)
Á¡ÆÛ(ÆǸŸ¶°¨)
Ư°¡ÆǸŠ<==ÁøÇàÁß
ºþ¦¼¼ÀÏ
-Ä«µå°áÁ¦¿ë-
Home
> ¹®ÀÇ °Ô½ÃÆÇ ¼öÁ¤
°³ÀÎÁ¤º¸ À¯ÃâÀ» ¹æÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÏ¿© E-Mail°ú ÀüȹøÈ£´Â ÇØ´ç¶õ¿¡ ±âÀçÇÏ¿© ÁÖ½Ã¸é °¨»çÇÏ°Ú½À´Ï´Ù.
À̸§
*
*
´Â ¹Ýµå½Ã ÀÔ·ÂÇØ ÁֽʽÿÀ.
Æнº¿öµå
*
¼öÁ¤, »èÁ¦½Ã¿¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
E-Mail
*
°ø°³ÇÏÁö ¾Ê½À´Ï´Ù.
ÀüȹøÈ£
°ø°³ÇÏÁö ¾Ê½À´Ï´Ù.
Á¦¸ñ
*
³»¿ë
*
Have you got a telephone directory? http://www.scotland2000.com/cheap-topamax-overnight.pdf discontent attack order topamax overnight headless sir I would support having someone in charge of monetary policy who is more inflation averse than I, precisely because of commitment. Can it work?Just look at the evidence of… a recent paper by Alberto Alesina and me…. Countries like Germany,where the monetary authoritie sare independent, achieve very low rates of inflation without monetary rules. But one also finds there is no systematic difference in real economic performance among those countries that achieve low inflation and political independence for monetary policy and those that don't have independent central banks. Unless it can be demonstrated that the political institutional route to low inflation--to commitment that preserves the discretion to deal with unexpected contingencies and multiple equilibria--is undesirable or cannot work, I don't see any case at all for monetary rules.
¸ñ·Ï
»ç¾÷ÀÚµî·Ï¹øÈ£: 607-10-79364 ºÎ°¡Åë½Å»ç¾÷½Å°í : ºÎ»ê Á¦ 455È£
Copyright (C) 2001 Å©¸®¿¡ÀÌƼºê µðÁöÅÐ All rights reserved.